Global standardization or national differentiation of HRM practices in multinational companies? A comparison of multinationals in five countries by Edwards, Tony et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1057/s41267-016-0003-6
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Edwards, T., Sánchez-Mangas, R., Jalette, P., Lavelle, J., & Minbaeva, D. (2016). Global standardization or
national differentiation of HRM practices in multinational companies? A comparison of multinationals in five
countries. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES, 47(8), 997-1021. DOI: 10.1057/s41267-016-
0003-6
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
1 
 
Global Standardization or National Differentiation of Performance Management Practices in 
Multinational Companies? A Comparison of Multinationals in Six Countries 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Drawing on a dataset constructed from a parallel series of nationally representative surveys of 
multinational companies (MNCs), we compare the performance management (PM) practices of 
MNCs in the UK, Ireland, Canada, Spain, Denmark and Norway. In each country we analyze data 
relating to MNCs from that country and of the foreign affiliates of US MNCs. We argue that there is 
evidence of standardization in the nature of practices across countries, particularly evident in the 
analysis of US MNCs. Standardization of practices among MNCs is also evident in the rather limited 
variation in practices between US and indigenous MNCs within each country. Moreover, even where 
there is evidence of variation across and within countries, this cannot be fully explained by adaptation 
to local institutional constraints but rather can be seen as the product of how distinct national contexts 
can promote the take-up of practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last two decades many researchers have focused on how multinational companies 
(MNCs) standardize human resource management (HRM) practices across countries. Strategies of 
standardization can be based on HRM practices that constitute a ‘firm specific advantage’ (Rugman 
and Verbeke, 2003). Some authors have argued that standardization around ‘a worldwide best 
practices model is clearly present’ (Pudelko and Harzing, 2007). However, there remain significant 
forces towards adapting practices to national context. The continuing diversity in national ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) suggests that MNCs are at least partially constrained by local 
institutions. Indeed, some have argued that ‘adherence to local practices is the dominant influence’ on 
the practices of MNCs (Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994:250). More recently, other authors have argued 
that MNCs balance the standardization and differentiation of their practices (e.g. Stavrou, Brewster 
and Charalambous, 2010). Bonache, Trullen and Sanchez (2012:1779) argue for a ‘culturally-
animated universalism’ in which MNCs balance the advantages of universalism (standardization) with 
those of culturalism (differentiation). Similarly, the concept of ‘institutional distance’ has been used to 
analyze ways in which MNCs handle these competing pressures. The institutions of the parent 
company and those from the subsidiary’s host environment combine to create conditions of 
‘institutional duality’ and the extent of divergence between these twin pressures is the institutional 
distance (Kostova, 1999; Salomon and Wu, 2012). The greater is this distance, so the argument goes, 
the more complicated is the transfer of practices. (See Caprar, Devinney, Kirkman and Caligiuri, 2015 
for a review of the parallel arguments concerning culture and cultural distance). 
Notwithstanding its contribution, this literature suffers from two theoretical weaknesses. First, 
it has played down the heterogeneous nature of MNCs operating in the same institutional context. 
This heterogeneity resulted in the fact that institutional pressures are rarely uniform and coherent 
across a country; instead, institutions are partial in their coverage and malleable in the hands of large 
firms (Jackson and Deeg, 2008). Thus we need to incorporate this notion of ‘intra-national’ 
heterogeneity into our analysis, which we do by examining one form of this heterogeneity, namely the 
extent of difference in practices between distinct national groups of MNCs. Second, the 
standardization–differentiation literature has also played down a different element of heterogeneity, 
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namely the range of ways in which MNCs develop international strategies in HRM. It is widely 
assumed that all MNCs want to standardize their HR practices across countries and only fail to do so 
if they reluctantly accept the constraints of host countries (see Edwards and Kuruvilla, 2005). In 
reality, however, the strategies and configurations of MNCs are diverse, with some seeking to 
segment their operations so that they concentrate particular functions in the countries with the most 
advantageous conditions (Dunning, 2009) and, accordingly, they deliberately differentiate their 
employment practices to benefit from country-specific conditions (Wilkinson et al., 2001; Compa, 
2012).  
In addition to these theoretical weaknesses, there are also methodological limitations in 
empirical studies of standardization–differentiation. With some exceptions (e.g. Brewster, Wood and 
Brookes, 2008; Pudelko and Harzing, 2007), previous research has failed to study MNCs in their 
original country. A key test of whether MNCs really have developed standardized practices along the 
lines of global norms is whether they manage their indigenous workforces in similar ways. If they are 
globally integrated firms influenced by comparable competitive forces then we would see similar 
patterns of practice in the domestic operations of MNCs across countries. Ideally, cross-national 
studies involve one group of MNCs being compared with those of another; as a comparator to 
indigenous MNCs, those from the USA are interesting conceptually because they are emissaries of the 
dominant economic system (Smith and Meiksins, 1995). Moreover, in a large majority of developed 
nations and many developing nations too, US FDI is the biggest single national source (Dicken, 
2011). 
We address the following two questions. First, are there differences in the take-up of practices 
across countries? This will help us address whether there are localizing effects in evidence, or whether 
these have been over-ridden by the pressures towards standardization. We address this for MNCs as a 
whole and subsequently by splitting MNCs into the separate groups of indigenous and US-owned. 
Second, are there significant differences in the take-up of practices between these two groups?  In 
addressing this question we will explore one element of the extent of ‘intra-national’ heterogeneity of 
MNCs of different nationalities and compare this across countries. By examining the practices of 
indigenous firms alongside those of the dominant economic power, the USA, we are able to throw 
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new light on the crucial, yet neglected, issue of how MNCs manage their domestic workforces and on 
the issue of how US MNCs operate in a set of contrasting host countries. Analysis of survey data 
relating to a set of performance management (PM) practices in MNCs across six countries 
demonstrates that there is evidence of standardization in the nature of practices across countries, 
particularly evident in the analysis of US MNCs. Standardization of practices among MNCs is also 
evident in the rather limited variation in practices between US and indigenous MNCs within each 
country. Moreover, even where there is evidence of variation across and within countries, this cannot 
be fully explained by adaptation to local institutional constraints but rather can be seen as the product 
of how distinct national institutions can promote the take-up of practices. 
The paper is structured as follows. We review lessons from the standardization–
differentiation literature in the next section and establish our key theoretical constructs and hypotheses 
in the subsequent one. Thereafter, we describe and justify our method, present the results, discuss the 
implications of these and draw conclusions. 
 
RESEARCHING STANDARDIZATION–DIFFERENTIATION IN MNCs 
Studies of the standardization–differentiation issue have adopted contrasting research designs. 
Some research uses a single host country (e.g. Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994) while others are multi-
country studies (e.g. Farndale, Brewster and Poutsma, 2008). The latter have the clear advantage of 
allowing comparisons across host countries. However, large numbers of host countries make it 
impossible to contextualize the findings. Consequently, configurations of national institutions are 
reduced to dummy variables or indices, such as ‘country institutional profiles’ (Kostova and Roth, 
2002), with little discussion of how they inform the practices of MNCs (Jackson and Deeg, 2008). 
Thus the challenge is to have sufficient national diversity to facilitate interesting comparisons but not 
so much as to prevent a consideration of each country. A further contrast is that while MNCs from 
different countries are sometimes grouped together into broad and diverse categories, often simply 
‘foreign’ (e.g. Brewster et al., 2008), others separate out particular nationalities (e.g. Pudelko and 
Harzing, 2007). A way of balancing these considerations is to group countries only where they share 
relevant institutional characteristics. Adapting the distinction made by Whetten (1989), a desire for 
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‘comprehensiveness’ in incorporating every national specificity must be weighed against the need for 
‘parsimony’ by grouping countries that share institutions that are likely to affect the variables of 
interest.  
Previous research also varies with respect to how particular practices are studied. Some 
research asks respondents to provide information on the workforce as a whole (e.g. Brewster et al., 
2008; Pudelko and Harzing, 2007) while other research asks questions pertaining to particular 
occupational groups (e.g. Marginson et al., 2010). The former may lack precision with respondents 
providing information that is an ‘average’ of the whole workforce, masking differences between 
groups, or the respondent may focus on a particular group which is not representative of the 
workforce. Asking about particular occupational groups minimizes this problem. Similarly, while 
some studies have asked about broad characteristics to which practices tend (e.g. Pudelko and 
Harzing, 2007), others seek information on particular practices in operation (Farndale et al., 2008). 
The danger of the former is that the data relate to what is ‘intended’ by policy makers in HR rather 
than what is ‘implemented’ and experienced by employees (Khilji and Wang, 2006; see also 
Björkman, Ehrnrooth, Smale, and John, 2011). The gap between the two may be particularly 
significant in international research in which ‘intended’ policies may reflect the formal institutions 
that policy-makers can easily understand but are less likely to reflect informal institutions. 
The practices here are in the area of PM, specifically whether individual performance is 
assessed, whether these assessments are ranked in a ‘forced distribution’ and whether employees’ pay 
is linked to their individual performance. This area is one that MNCs see as strategically important, 
requiring an internationally coordinated approach, particularly for managers (Björkman and Lervik, 
2007:325). Moreover, we anticipate that US MNCs will see these practices as particularly important 
given the institutional context of the home country. A concerted attempt to measure the performance 
of individual employees, as opposed to groups, is evident in the prevalence of individual appraisal 
schemes in the USA (Chiang and Birtch, 2007; Ramamoorthy and Carroll, 1998), while the emphasis 
on rating the relative performance of employees is evident in the popularity of ‘forced distributions’ 
among US firms (Grote, 2005; Lawler, 2003). By international standards, pay in the USA is more 
commonly determined by assessments of performance (Ferner and Almond, 2013; Jacoby, 2005). 
6 
 
This emphasis on individualism is a key characteristic of the USA, enshrined both in terms of the 
formal institutions, such as the anti-collectivist forms of labour regulation, and the informal 
institutions, norms and values which afford these practices a degree of legitimacy (e.g. Almond and 
Ferner, 2006). In this sense, PM is an appropriate area to examine if we want to consider the influence 
of US institutions. Moreover, it is likely that they will also be constrained by the institutions of the 
host countries (a point we return to in the next section). 
The strategic importance placed on PM might mean that MNCs, especially US-owned ones, 
pursue a coherent ‘bundle’ of practices which are ‘integrated’ with compatible practices with which 
they are ‘working in concert’ (Björkman and Lervik, 2007:323). Indeed, the practices we examine are 
often seen as an important part of a coherent approach to ‘high performance work systems’ (Becker 
and Huselid, 1998). However, compensation and appraisal practices often perform overlapping yet 
partially distinct functions: the former are seen as effective in shaping knowledge, skills, abilities and 
motivation but not empowerment; the latter are perceived to influence motivation and empowerment, 
but not knowledge, skills or abilities (Jiang, Takeuchi and Lepak, 2013:1469). Thus variable pay may 
perform one set of functions, while appraisal might fulfil other goals, and they will not necessarily be 
as integrated as the notion of bundles suggests.  
Out of this review of previous work has emerged a rationale for country selection (some 
diversity in institutional context but not so many countries as to prevent a detailed consideration of 
each) and for the practices (a clear focus on an area of HRM which is one of strategic importance in 
MNCs while also subject to institutional influences). We now turn to consider how institutional theory 
can help us build hypotheses. 
 
WHY DO WE FIND SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES AMONG MNCs? 
A key insight of organizational institutionalism is that organizational practices not only reflect 
internal efficiency motives but also “logics of appropriateness” that are conditioned by their 
institutional environments (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Such dominant logics reflect isomorphic 
pressures for conformity that are shared by actors in the same organizational domain. Organizations 
conform to such pressures in order to gain endorsement from important referent audiences 
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(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta and Lounsbury, 2011), thereby increasing organizational 
legitimacy and facilitating access to important resources, such as funds or licenses to operate (Pache 
and Santos, 2010).  
Given that MNCs are embedded in their home country (Tan and Meyer, 2011; Wang, Clegg 
and Kafouros, 2009), they must continue to gain a degree of approval from their ‘referent audiences’ 
(Greenwood et al., 2011) in their original national base as they expand internationally. In particular, 
satisfying owners’ demands is an important element of a ‘governance’ or ‘country of origin’ effect 
(Ferner, 1997). Thus MNCs of differing nationalities exhibit distinct patterns of management 
coordination and control internationally. For US MNCs, this country-of-origin effect is likely to be 
particularly pronounced as the ways in which US firms developed in their home country provide them 
with the organizational means with which to expand internationally by extending management 
structures and forms of control to other countries (Ferner et al., 2004). Thus exercising control over 
their operations in other countries is easier relative to MNCs (ibid.) of other nations and it is salient to 
examine US MNCs as a counterpoint to indigenous MNCs. 
Indeed, this salience is even greater when we consider ‘dominance effects’. At any one time 
there is a hierarchy of nation states according to their economic performance, with the ‘dominant’ 
model forming the basis of a set of practices that attract interest amongst actors in other countries 
(Smith and Meiskins, 1995). As MNCs become more internationally integrated, the organizational 
barriers to common policies decline, while the growth of international competition has created greater 
interest in the practices of firms internationally and the greater ease with which information can be 
transmitted across borders has meant that the interest in cross-national transfer is greater than ever. 
Such developments can go hand-in-hand with management techniques across the world increasingly 
revolving around notions of global ‘best practice’ (e.g. Jain, Lawler and Morishima, 1998). Moreover, 
Pudelko and Harzing (2007) considered the relative influences of country-of-origin, localization and 
dominance effects on HRM practices in their study of US, German and Japanese MNCs and 
concluded that ‘overall the dominance effect is most important’ (2007:535). Recently, the dominant 
national model has been the USA and consequently US MNCs’ origins in the world’s most powerful 
economy mean that they become bearers of dominance effects (Edwards and Ferner, 2002). In a 
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similar vein, Kostova, Roth and Dacin (2008:999) have argued that ‘a single clearly defined 
organizational field does not exist’ for MNCs and that this gives ‘these organizations broader latitude 
in picking and choosing which models to adopt and to what extent they should respond to institutional 
influences’. In particular, they argue that there is little enforcement mechanism for the ‘cognitive and 
normative institutional components’ that they encounter in different countries. 
The ability of MNCs originating in the dominant economy to exploit the room for manoeuvre 
that exists within each host country is significant because of the way in which dominance effects act 
to reinforce country-of-origin effects in US MNCs. Accordingly, recent evidence has shown that US 
MNCs adopt a more centralized approach to managing their international workforces than MNCs of 
other nationalities (Ferner, Belanger, Tregaskis, Morley and Quintanilla, 2013). Moreover, the 
practices of US MNCs are only ‘partly rooted in the local cultural, political and legal structures of the 
country of operation’ (Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdall, 1998:63) with these firms taking 
concerted steps to avoid the influence of bodies that make it difficult to implement their preferred 
policies and practices (Tempel, Edwards, Ferner, Muller-Carmen and Wachter, 2006). This argument 
has been forcefully developed by Geary and Roche (2001) who reject what they call the ‘new 
conformance thesis’ – the idea that US MNCs in Ireland have conformed to local practices – and point 
instead to the ‘predominance of country-of-origin effects over host country effects’ (2001:109). This 
indicates that US MNCs employ similar practices worldwide. 
While country-of-origin and dominance effects may lead US MNCs to standardize their 
practices in a way that may over-ride local institutions, there are grounds for believing that 
institutional pressures toward differentiation will be evident in MNCs more generally. The institutions 
in host countries have certainly not converged completely, as the comparative capitalisms literature 
has demonstrated (Jackson and Deeg, 2008), and this diversity leads to pressures for MNCs to seek 
legitimacy by adapting to national norms; over-riding these norms completely, particularly those with 
regulatory status, entails some costs, either in terms of motivational problems among the workforce or 
through breaking the law (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Indeed, one strand of the literature has 
emphasized local influences on the employment practices of MNCs (e.g. Buckley and Enderwick, 
1985; Turner, D’Art and Gunnigle, 1997; Björkman, Fey and Park, 2007; Gooderham, Nordhaug and 
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Ringdal, 1998). In a widely cited paper (171 citations in EBSCO), Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994) 
argued that the US affiliates of foreign-owned MNCs ‘tend primarily to resemble local practices’ and 
that this supported ‘the view of MNCs as a nexus of differentiated practices’ (1994:248). Given this, it 
seems improbable that the forces towards standardization are so strong that localization tendencies are 
no longer evident at all in MNCs. 
Where MNCs seek to spread the individualist PM practices we examine across countries they 
may be ‘challenged on grounds of alternative normative frameworks, emphasizing (for example) 
social equity, solidarity and fairness’ (Ferner et al., 2012:167). Specifically, there are two particular 
elements of an institutional framework that may constrain this take-up. The first relates to the norms 
concerning inequality. Individualized appraisal and pay appear to be easier to implement in countries 
characterized by substantial income inequalities (Gooderham, Grogaard and Nordhaug, 2013). Where 
incomes differ markedly there seems to be a greater acceptance of practices that distinguish explicitly 
between individuals according to their performance, particularly for workers in better paying jobs 
(Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent, 2009). Thus the constraints to the take-up of such practices are likely 
to be strongest in countries with low levels of inequality. The second concerns the influence of 
employee representation, with the need to negotiate the introduction and operation of these practices 
varying across countries. Employees in countries with strong trade unions are those most likely to 
have the organizational means to mount opposition. Individualized appraisal and pay have commonly 
been viewed with suspicion by unions, who are concerned that this reduces their involvement in the 
setting of pay in particular and the basis for collective organization more generally (Heery, 2000). 
Reviewing the evidence concerning unions’ effects on management and HRM, Verma (2005) 
observes that union opposition to the subjective nature of performance appraisal has led to the 
incidence of this practice being lower in unionized firms. Similarly, unions have commonly opposed 
performance pay based on individual performance as anti-collectivist; indeed, the incidence of 
performance pay is often lower in unionized workplaces (Gunningle, Turner and D’Art, 1998). Thus 
we might anticipate that the higher the coverage of trade unions across firms, the stronger are the 
barriers to introducing individualized PM practices. Gooderham et al. (2013) cite the example of 
Scandinavian countries (characterized by relatively low levels of income inequality and high levels of 
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trade union density) where the use of performance appraisal and individualized pay is less widespread 
than in other countries such as the UK. We refer to these two factors – low levels of inequality and 
high levels of union density – as the institutional constraints to introducing PM practices, and 
hypothesize that: 
H1: MNCs in countries with stronger institutional constraints have a lower take-up of a) 
individual appraisal b) forced distribution and c) variable pay. 
The first hypothesis focuses on differences across countries between MNCs of different 
nationalities in aggregate. As argued above, one disadvantage of grouping firms together is that it 
masks differences between nationalities. Thus we examine whether there are differences in the take-
up of practices between the domestic operations of MNCs in each country. Where the domestic 
operations of MNCs are integrated into the wider firm and where ‘dominance effects’ are at play not 
just among US firms but also among MNCs of other nationalities, then the domestic operations of one 
nationality of MNCs may exhibit strong similarities with the domestic operations of others. 
However, national effects on the take-up of practices in MNCs are especially likely to be 
evident among indigenous MNCs. This is partly because the domestic operations of MNCs are firmly 
rooted in the national context; while foreign MNCs sometimes establish ‘greenfield’ operations 
allowing greater freedom in breaking with local norms, indigenous MNCs generally have longer 
lasting linkages with the country and are, therefore, more likely to go with the grain of local practice. 
National effects also arise because of a ‘governance’ effect; the embeddedness of MNCs in their 
original country means that they exhibit distinct patterns of management coordination and control that 
reflect these national institutions. Thus for indigenous MNCs the constraining effect of national 
institutions and the governance effects of institutions emanate from the same national system and 
consolidate one another. This is likely to lead to notable differences between MNCs from different 
countries. Thus the pressures of dominance effects are highly unlikely to be so strong that the 
domestic operations of MNCs in one country have the same take-up of practices as those in other 
countries. We anticipate that localization tendencies will be in evidence across all of the PM practices 
and hypothesize that: 
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H2 Indigenous MNCs in countries with stronger institutional constraints have a lower take-
up of a) individual appraisal b) forced distribution and c) variable pay. 
We have predicted that the practices of indigenous MNCs will vary across the five countries 
but that those of US MNCs will not vary to the same extent, potentially creating one form of ‘intra-
national’ heterogeneity. As noted above, the standardization–differentiation literature has played 
down the heterogeneous nature of institutions at national level. Given the growing diversity of the 
workforces in many countries, intra-national variations in informal institutions, such as work values, 
can be as great as variations across countries (Tung, 2008). As Crouch (2005) argues, much of the 
comparative capitalism literature plays down the partial coverage and malleability of most 
institutions; in practice, there is almost always scope for economic actors to experiment in the 
practices they deploy. Accordingly, Morgan (2009:582) argues that MNCs are ‘active in developing 
institutional supports and therefore are central to processes of institutional reform and change’. As 
Jackson and Deeg (2008:555) put it, ‘while firm heterogeneity was always, to one degree or another, a 
feature of national models, the growth of MNEs does imply that the formal mechanisms of 
institutionalization at the national level may become more fragmented, and lead to an overall increase 
of diversity’. 
While this notion of heterogeneity has not been satisfactorily incorporated into the 
standardization–differentiation literature, there are illustrations in the wider literature of how MNCs 
actively contribute to heterogeneity (e.g. Heywood and Jarjahn, 2014). For instance, Japanese 
manufacturers have clustered together in host countries, often in areas without a strong industrial 
tradition, creating distinct forms of business activity, particularly concerning their labor practices 
(Elger and Smith, 2005). Moreover, Katz and Darbishire’s (2000) analysis of seven industrialized 
nations was that there was increasing variation within each of these countries and that one source of 
this variation within countries was MNCs, particularly Japanese investments, which have ‘spread 
Japanese-oriented work practices, thereby adding another source of variation in employment 
conditions’ (2000:5). Katz and Darbishire (2000) argue that the extent of variation in employment 
practices within countries is shaped by the character of industrial relations institutions.  
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Indeed, institutional effects may lead to differing degrees of intra-national variation across 
countries. So far we have argued that, compared with US MNCs, the practices of indigenous MNCs 
will be more in line with national norms; the logic of this argument is that the extent of difference 
between US MNCs and indigenous ones will be modest in countries that share some institutional 
characteristics – particularly the norms concerning inequality and the extent of union density – with 
the US. Accordingly, research in the UK and Ireland has demonstrated that a similar proportion of 
foreign-owned and indigenous firms used performance-related pay (e.g. Buckley and Enderwick, 
1985; Turner et al., 1997). In contrast, where the national institutions are markedly different from 
those of the US, the difference in practices between US and indigenous MNCs will be greater. Thus 
we hypothesize that: 
H3: The difference between US MNCs and indigenous MNCs in the take-up of a) individual 
appraisal b) forced distribution and c) variable pay will be greater in countries with strong 
institutional constraints. 
 
METHOD 
The Research Design 
The research comprises coordinated, parallel, nationally representative surveys of 
employment practices in MNCs. This paper is based on six surveys – the UK, Canada, Ireland, Spain, 
Denmark and Norway – and draws on the data for indigenous and US-owned MNCs. The respondent 
was a senior HRM executive who completed a structured questionnaire, focused on several aspects of 
employment practice and which distinguished between managers and the largest occupational group 
(LOG) of non-managerial employees. The surveys also asked a number of questions about the 
national operations and the worldwide company, allowing a range of controls to be used. Somewhat 
surprisingly, much of the literature does not control for factors which we know are key influences on 
many HRM practices: sometimes no controls are used (e.g. Pudelko and Harzing, 2007); where they 
are used they are normally restricted to basic elements of the subsidiary (e.g. Brewster et al., 2008); 
only rarely are characteristics of the wider multinational included, such as size of the worldwide firm 
and its structure (e.g. Marginson et al., 2010); and never are controls included which provide proxies 
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for the inclination and ability of MNCs to standardize practices (which we term ‘strategic 
heterogeneity’).  
Concerning representativeness, some previous surveys do not provide any information on 
how they established their population while others name a single source as their population listing 
(e.g. Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994). The dangers of relying on single sources are the incompleteness 
of, and inaccuracies in, each listing.  Each of our surveys was representative of the population of 
MNCs in that country, focusing on all but the smallest MNCs (those with less than 500 employees 
worldwide). To ensure representativeness we used multiple listings and resolved discrepancies 
through labor-intensive cross-checking. The resulting list was ‘screened’ to check crucial aspects, a 
time-consuming but important process; it revealed that many companies were smaller than the initial 
listing had suggested or were part of the same multinational as another firm in the listing. Moreover, 
checks were conducted to make sure that the profile of MNCs in the achieved sample was in line with 
the population1. Thus the surveys are based on comprehensive and reliable population listings. 
There were three further challenges. First, the questionnaire was designed in English and was 
translated into French, Spanish, Danish and Norwegian. These translations were carefully checked 
(including back translation) in order to ascertain that equivalence in meaning had not been distorted 
(Hult et al., 2008). Second, the method of administering the questionnaire through face-to-face 
interviews allows a longer questionnaire and results in fewer missing data (McKnight, McKnight, 
Sidani and Figueredo, 2007). This was pursued in the countries where it was feasible: the UK, Ireland 
and Spain. In Canada, however, the geographical distances made interviews prohibitively expensive, 
so respondents completed the questionnaire through a paper version or online. In Denmark and 
Norway, data were collected online, the preferred way of collecting data in Scandinavia. Non-
response to questions in the Canadian, Danish and Norwegian surveys was not significantly higher 
than in the other three. Third, the surveys were in the field at different times. The fieldwork was 
carried out in 2006 and early 2007 in the UK, Canada and Ireland but in Spain the fieldwork began in 
2007 and extended until early 2009 while in Denmark and Norway the survey was carried out in 2009 
and early 2010. Such a time lag between surveys used in comparative analysis is not unusual (e.g. 
Whitfield, Marginson and Brown, 1994), though it is potentially important given the change in 
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economic conditions. We checked whether the data gathered towards the end of the fieldwork period 
in Spain were significantly different from those gathered earlier. Regression analysis on the Spanish 
data for the six practices examined here revealed that the differences between the data collected pre- 
and post-crisis were insignificant. 
The response rates varied across the six surveys, from 15% in Canada, 18% in the UK, 25% 
in Norway, 26% in Denmark, 30% in Spain to 50% in Ireland. The lower response rates were 
generally in the countries with the larger populations, meaning that the overall numbers of 
participating firms in each country did not vary as much as the response rates, while the checks for 
non-response bias suggested this problem is very limited. The total number of indigenous MNCs was 
276 (44 in UK, 43 in Canada, 47 in Ireland, 83 in Spain, 30 in Denmark and 29 in Norway) and US-
owned MNCs totaled 444 (123 in UK, 106 in Canada, 101 in Ireland, 90 in Spain, 17 in Denmark and 
7 in Norway), giving a total across the five countries of 720. 
Variables and Form of Analysis 
Dependent variables. There are six practices that we assess: individual appraisal for the LOG 
and for managers; forced distributions in appraisal for the LOG and for managers; and variable pay 
for the LOG and for managers2. For each of these, we assessed the existence or otherwise of the 
practice in the national operations of the MNC. We analyzed these six binary variables individually 
rather than in a bundle to allow for the different functions that they may perform (see above) as well 
as to allow for the possibility that they may be subject to different degrees of institutional constraint. 
Thus we allow for the patterns to vary by each practice and employee group3. 
Explanatory variables. Our analysis of the national context was shaped by the extent of 
similarities and differences in institutions, particularly the extent of inequality and union density. To 
balance the desire to cater for important institutional specificities whilst also achieving a degree of 
parsimony in the analysis, we have grouped countries only where they share characteristics in terms 
of these institutional constraints. As Table 1 shows, the two Nordic countries are clearly distinct from 
the other four, with lower inequality and higher union density. Indeed, previous analysis of the Nordic 
area has highlighted important institutional similarities across countries in the region (e.g. Amable, 
2003) and, hence, Denmark and Norway form a Nordic grouping which is the reference category. 
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While the other four countries are not all of the same type of capitalism – the UK, Ireland and Canada 
are all broadly deregulated labour markets with single channel forms of employee representation, 
distinct from Spain in these respects – they share broad similarities in terms of the institutional 
constraints to PM practices, as Table 1 demonstrates. They are not exactly the same of course, with 
Spain and the UK exhibiting slightly higher inequality and lower union density. To allow for the 
possibility that the extent of institutional difference between the Nordic countries and the others may 
vary, we include a Nordic variable and the four individual country variables in the analysis4. The third 
hypothesis, examining differences within countries, requires Denmark and Norway to be considered 
individually. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
We used a dummy variable for US ownership. Some of the controls relate to characteristics of 
the subsidiaries: the sector variable contrasts production and services; the size dummy captures 
subsidiaries of 1000 or more employees; and union presence assesses the existence of certified trade 
unions in the subsidiary. Other controls relate to characteristics of the worldwide company. The size 
variable contrasts small MNCs (less than 5000 employees worldwide) with medium (between 5000 
and 29999) and large (30000+), with the small group forming the reference category.  
As argued in the introduction, the analysis of standardization-differentiation needs to be tested 
in a way that is sensitive to the fact that not all MNCs possess the capabilities to standardize practices 
across borders: some staffing strategies are more effective than others at transferring knowledge 
(Mäkelä, Björkman and Ehrnrooth, 2009); there is variation in the extent to which MNCs align formal 
process and systems and the more informal sharing of objectives across key staff, with this affecting 
their ability to ‘replicate’ practices across borders (Morris et al., 2009); and the experience of 
subsidiary HR managers varies, shaping the extent to which MNCs can develop strategic HR 
capabilities (Mäkelä, Sumelius, Hogland and Ahlvik, 2012). Moreover, some MNCs will indeed seek 
to standardize and create the necessary capabilities and the forces of country of origin and dominance 
effects accentuate this in many MNCs. In contrast, other MNCs will make a virtue out of 
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differentiating practices across countries (Edwards and Kuruvilla, 2005). Thus we incorporate the 
notion of heterogeneity (for which we use the term ‘strategic heterogeneity’) into our analysis through 
controlling for two factors, the existence of an international policy-making committee in HRM and a 
variable capturing the intensity of networking between HRM practitioners across borders (a 
composite measure of four elements of networking - regular meetings, international conferences, task 
forces and virtual groups - that were used at least annually, with the resulting variable taking on 
values between 0 for none of them and 4 for all of them). These two final control variables allow us to 
control for the inclination and capability of MNCs to standardize HR practices across borders; in other 
words, to control for strategic heterogeneity. 
Analysis. The six binary variables are analyzed using logistic regression. We started with a 
block of the control variables and added a second block of country dummies and the US ownership 
dummy. A third block consists of interaction effects between US ownership and the country dummies. 
The fourth block includes, for each country, the interaction between being a domestic firm and the 
dummy for operating in that country. The inclusion of these blocks enables us to address the set of 
hypotheses we formulate, as explained below. 
 In deciding to use interaction terms, we considered the alternative of splitting the sample into 
sub-samples. Each approach has drawbacks. While the interpretation of the results through the use of 
interaction terms is not entirely straightforward, we feel that using sub-samples entails more 
significant disadvantages, most obviously that some of the sub-samples become quite small and that 
the variability of some of the explanatory variables falls to very low levels. Thus we felt that the use 
of interaction terms is preferable. As a check, we re-ran the analysis using the sub-samples approach 
and compared the results. In essence, where the sample size of the sub-samples allows for 
comparison, the findings do not change greatly. Since we estimate logit models, the difference in the 
coefficients do not provide differences in the estimated probabilities. To quantify the differences in 
the probabilities of taking-up the practices across countries, we have tested the marginal effects 
stemming from the estimated models. 
 
RESULTS    
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The descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Some of the practices, such as 
individual appraisal and variable pay for managers, are widespread across countries while others, such 
as forced distributions, are present in only a minority. Some of the explanatory variables are 
significantly correlated with one another. However, the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics for all 
models indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
 
TABLES 2, 3 AND 4a TO 4d HERE 
 
The logistic regression results are presented in Tables 4a to 4d. All estimated models are 
significant, with satisfactory to good levels of variation explained. In Tables 4a to 4c, the results are 
presented in three columns for each practice corresponding to the blocks of variables identified above, 
with the logit coefficients and standard errors. The inclusion of the controls is justified by all models 
being significant with the controls only (column A in Tables 4a to 4c) and each control being 
significant in at least one model. Interestingly, in all of the models at least one of the HR function 
variables – an international HR policy-making committee and networking between HR practitioners 
across countries – is significant in one or more of the variants, confirming that controlling for strategic 
heterogeneity is indeed important. The results for the country dummies in column B capture the 
aggregate differences between the countries, enabling us to address hypothesis 1. There are significant 
differences in all six models. In column C, which includes both the country dummies and their 
interactions with US ownership, the results for the country variables assess the differences in the take-
up of PM practices in the domestic operations of indigenous MNCs across countries, thus allowing us 
to test hypothesis 2. There is at least one significant difference between Nordic MNCs and the other 
national groups of MNCs for all six practices. Also from the results in column C, but looking at both 
the country dummies and their interactions with US ownership, we can assess differences in the PM 
practices of US MNCs across countries. In Table 4d we present each practice in one column. Besides 
the controls, we include the interactions of the country dummies with US ownership and also with 
being a domestic firm, helping us to test the differences in the take up of the practices between US 
and indigenous MCS in each country. From the estimated coefficients in Tables 4a-4d, we have 
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computed the estimated differences in the probability of taking-up the PM practices across countries5. 
The results are reported in Table 5, which contains panels for each of the tests we conduct.  
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Regarding hypotheses 1a-c (Table 5, first panel), there are some significant differences in the 
anticipated direction. MNCs in the Nordic area are less likely than those in three of the other four 
countries (UK, Canada and Ireland) to deploy individual appraisal for managers and less likely than 
those in all four countries to use variable pay for managers. They are also less likely than those in the 
UK to use variable pay for the LOG. However, contrary to expectations, they are more likely than 
those in three of the other countries (UK, Canada and Ireland) to use forced distribution for the LOG 
and more likely than those in all four to use forced distribution for managers. There are some 
insignificant differences too, including for all country comparisons for appraisal for the LOG. Overall, 
there is support for hypotheses 1a and 1c for the managerial group but not the LOG and no support for 
H1b. 
Concerning hypotheses 2a-c (second panel of Table 5), indigenous MNCs in the Nordic area 
are less likely than those in the UK to have appraisal for the LOG, less likely than those in Ireland to 
have appraisal for managers, less likely than those in Canada and Spain to have variable pay for 
managers. All of the other comparisons for appraisal and variable pay were insignificant. (We cannot 
provide estimates for appraisal for managers among UK MNCs because the dependent variable has no 
variability – all of the firms in this group have the practice). For forced distributions, the results 
revealed significant differences between those in the Nordic area and those in the UK, Ireland and 
Canada but in the opposite direction to that hypothesized. Overall, there is very little support for H2a-
c.  
The third panel of Table 4 reports the results for the differences in the take-up of PM practices 
of US MNCs across countries. US MNCs in the Nordic area are significantly less likely to have 
variable pay for managers compared with those in all four of the other countries. In contrast, they are 
significantly more likely than those in the UK, Canada and Ireland to have appraisal for the LOG, 
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more likely than those in the UK to have forced distribution for the LOG and for managers, and more 
likely than those in Canada to have variable pay for the LOG. All of the other comparisons were 
insignificant. Overall, where there are significant differences these are not systematically in one or 
other direction, while there are a large number of insignificant differences. This largely confirms our 
starting position that US MNCs do not adapt their practices to institutional constraints.   
The differences in the take up of the practices between US and indigenous MNCs in the six 
countries are presented in the bottom panel of Table 5, enabling us to test the third set of hypotheses. 
In Canada US MNCs are more likely than indigenous ones to have forced distributions for managers, 
in Ireland they are more likely than Irish MNCs to have appraisal for the LOG and forced distribution 
for the LOG, and in Spain and Denmark they are more likely than indigenous ones to have appraisal 
for the LOG. Conversely, in the UK US MNCs are less likely than British MNCs to have appraisal for 
the LOG. In the main, though, it is evident from Table 5 that the differences between US MNCs and 
indigenous ones are largely insignificant and, in particular, the differences between the two groups are 
not more evident in Denmark and Norway than in the other countries. Hence, there is no support for 
Hypotheses 3a-3c. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results provide only limited support for the hypotheses and thus question the theoretical 
approach based on the constraining effect of cross-national differences, an approach which underpins 
much scholarship in this area. Thus the findings constitute a challenge to the conventional way of 
framing comparative analysis of MNCs and in making sense of them we return to the overarching 
themes of standardization, differentiation and heterogeneity of practices within countries.  
Overall, the story is not primarily one of differentiation created by institutional constraints. It 
is not surprising that this shows through in the analysis of US MNCs, where the results confirm our 
expectations that the take-up of PM practices across countries varies only partially. We argue that this 
reflects the combination of dominance effects and the way that US firms possess the organizational 
means with which to expand internationally by extending domestic management structures to other 
countries (Ferner et al., 2004). This has allowed US MNCs to establish control over their operations in 
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other countries to a greater extent than is the case in MNCs of most other nations and to adopt a 
preferred set of practices that are largely standardized across countries. It is more surprising, however, 
that the hypotheses concerning cross-national variation were not strongly supported, either for MNCs 
as a whole (H1) or for indigenous MNCs (H2). While some institutional analysis points to 
homogenizing processes across borders, the findings present challenges to the assumptions of other 
strands of work informed by institutions. In particular, they question the claims of Rosenzweig and 
Nohria (1994) concerning the primacy of localization pressures and suggest that the conventional 
wisdom of the constraining element of institutions is overstated, at least for PM practices.  
However, neither is there full standardization. There are some significant cross-national 
differences, indicating that the pressures of global competition are not so strong as to result in the 
take-up of PM practices being the same across countries. These findings qualify some of the stronger 
claims concerning standardization, such as Pudelko and Harzing’s argument that ‘convergence to a 
worldwide best practices model is clearly present’ (2007: 535). But if these differences are not all due 
to institutional constraints – and the fact that some are in the opposite direction to those hypothesized 
confirms that they are not – what does cause them? 
One interpretation is that the differences should be seen not just as the result of institutional 
constraints but also as the product of the strategizing of senior actors in MNCs who use institutions as 
resources to aid the introduction of new practices. As observed earlier, MNCs do not operate in a 
single organizational field and this gives them scope to pick and choose parts of models and adapt 
them in novel ways (Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008). Moreover, actors at senior level in MNCs can 
exploit the latitude that exists within fields, using a particular institution to gain acceptance to the 
implementation of new practices to which other aspects of the institutional context may not be 
conducive. The findings concerning forced distributions – for which Nordic MNCs have a 
significantly higher take-up that indigenous MNCs in the other countries – are intriguing in this 
respect. Whilst the Nordic economies are certainly characterized by higher union density and lower 
inequality, they are also made up of mixed or hybrid institutions (e.g. Campbell and Pedersen, 2008). 
In particular, some argue that labour markets are structured such that employees enjoy a high degree 
of security concerning their employment and income prospects whilst firms have considerable scope 
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for flexibility and experimentation, known as ‘flexicurity’ (Amable, 2003; Hagen and Trygstad, 2009; 
Kristensen and Morgan, 2012). The greater use of forced distributions in Nordic MNCs when 
compared with MNCs from the other countries may be due to ‘flexicurity’. Such practices may signal 
an attempt to drive forward a stronger performance culture than hitherto in a way that may provoke 
resistance from workers and their representatives who fear that they will jeopardize their job security. 
In the Nordic area, however, where employment and income security (whether with their current 
employer or another one) is strongly protected, forced distributions may not constitute a threat. This 
suggests that an institutional approach is indeed useful; institutions are not merely constraints on 
management, but rather should be seen as facilitating and promoting certain practices at firm level 
(Jackson and Deeg, 2008), in this case the use of PM practices. In this sense, we need both an actor-
centered form of institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997) and one that is sensitive to distinct national contexts. 
Turning to the issue of intra-national heterogeneity, how can we understand our findings? For 
those practices where there are significant differences between US and indigenous firms it may be that 
the two groups operate in different segments of the institutional context. In Ireland US MNCs more 
commonly appraise the individual performance of the LOG and use forced distributions in evaluating 
the performance of the LOG, but we do not find differences for managers. The Irish results should be 
seen in the light of the country’s industrial strategy, which has placed great emphasis on attracting 
foreign capital with public authorities creating a conducive institutional environment that allows 
foreign MNCs to operate with their desired practices, particularly the ‘tacit understanding of an 
MNC’s freedom to establish operations in a union-free environment, regardless of national 
partnership arrangements’ (Lamare, Gunnigle, Marginson and Murray, 2013:704). This clearly 
distinguishes them from the fledgling indigenous multinational sector which is seen as lagging behind 
more mature MNCs in the ‘sophistication’ of their practices (McDonnell, Lavelle and Gunnigle, 
2014). Thus we might characterize Ireland as consisting of distinct institutional fields for the foreign 
and indigenous sectors, with this showing up in differential take-up of practices for the LOG. Where 
we do find such heterogeneity, therefore, it may be that this is caused by the differential way in which 
institutions affect the two groups of firms. 
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The main finding, however, is that there is relatively little evidence of differences between 
US and indigenous MNCs in our six countries. One part of the reason for this may have to do with 
practices becoming very widespread among international firms such that they are part of a ‘global 
way’ of doing things. Indeed, the evidence on some of the practices, most notably individual appraisal 
for managers which are extremely widespread across both indigenous and US MNCs in all the 
countries we examined, indicates that in both groups of firms they have become part of the taken-for-
granted way of operating among MNCs, regardless of national context. This part of the explanation is 
consistent with a convergence view. However, another part of the answer may be quite different from 
the convergence explanation. This is that institutions in highly regulated economies can facilitate the 
introduction of PM practices in subtle and unanticipated ways. As argued above, the institutions that 
give rise to ‘flexicurity’ may promote some of these practices in Nordic MNCs, particularly forced 
distributions in indigenous firms. It is quite possible that the institutions in more deregulated 
economies such as the US promote these practices in a different way – namely that managers face less 
organized opposition to their introduction or operation – and that these pressures from the home 
country of US MNCs may be influential on their foreign operations. The upshot appears to be that 
different institutional configurations exerted on indigenous and US firms may produce a similar 
incidence of PM practices. 
  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has been based on a dataset constructed from a parallel series of national surveys 
of MNCs and their employment practices. The national comparisons have been between contrasting 
countries but within a manageable number, with the data pertaining to particular practices and 
identifiable occupational groups. The surveys have permitted a range of controls to be used and the 
representativeness of the data is high. In methodological terms, therefore, the paper has broken new 
ground. 
We have addressed two questions: (1) are there differences in the take-up of PM practices 
across six countries? and (2) are there significant differences in the take-up of practices between 
indigenous and US-owned MNCs in each of the countries? Regarding the first question, we found that 
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the take up of PM practices varies only partially across countries, and the variation we do observe 
cannot fully be explained by institutional constraints. Rather than rejecting an institutional approach 
outright, however, we argue that institutions can promote certain practices at firm level in a 
differential way across countries. In relation to the second question, there is relatively little evidence 
of systematic differences between indigenous and US firms, and a straightforward focus on the 
strength of institutional constraints does not have analytical purchase. While some practices, such as 
individual appraisal for managers, are so widespread in MNCs that we may see them as detached from 
institutional influences, this cannot be the whole story since most of the practices are not employed 
universally. Once again, we do not reject an institutionalist approach outright but rather argue that it 
needs to be applied in such a way that is sensitive to dual institutional fields that exist within some 
economies and to the subtle ways in which different national institutional frameworks can, through 
quite different processes, result in a similar take-up of practices across countries. Thus we have 
argued for an actor-centered form of institutionalism that is sensitive to distinct national contexts. 
This is significant theoretically because the mainstream approach to the standardization–
differentiation issue has focused on nationally coherent institutions and practices, sometimes through 
the use of categories of business system, sometimes through an overall measure or index of 
institutions and practices at national level. What this misses is that institutions do not simply constrain 
firms in consistent ways across an economy; rather, institutions sometimes have partial coverage 
within countries, they can promote the use of some practices as opposed to simply constraining them, 
and the impact of one institution may offset another. For practitioners in MNCs, understanding this 
diversity is a crucial consideration in such issues as investment decisions. For example, while an 
index or measure of national institutions may suggest certain adaptations to local context are 
necessary, in practice diverse patterns of practice associated with regions within countries may allow 
greater choice for MNCs. 
Implications 
Our study offers at least three implications for how MNCs are studied. The first concerns 
whether research should address particular practices or group practices together into bundles. The 
evidence strongly points to the need for disaggregated analysis; the national effects took different 
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forms for the different practices, so we should be wary of grouping practices together into categories. 
The second is related to the first and concerns whether we should examine particular countries or 
group them into clusters. Our argument concerning the subtle ways in which institutions operate in 
distinct national contexts indicates that researchers should be wary of grouping countries into 
categories such as ‘liberal market economies’ as some have argued (e.g. Morgan, 2009). The 
variations we have analyzed are more nationally and practice specific than that. Only where there are 
very strong similarities in institutions across countries, as we have argued is the case in the Nordic 
area, such categories may be used, albeit with caution. The third concerns the survey design. Many 
studies of MNCs and HRM practices are based on secondary data, often using surveys that were 
conducted without a specific focus on MNCs, such as the CRANET series. This approach makes 
sense in many ways, not least that it facilitates analysis of MNCs whilst avoiding the resource 
demands of conducting a new survey. But it also entails drawbacks, particularly that surveys that were 
not designed to look at MNCs tend not to contain data on the wider firm of which the surveyed 
subsidiary is a part. This means that the type of controls we have used, and demonstrated to be 
important, are not available. A major advance in our analysis compared with previous work has been 
the ability to control for several important influences on employment policy and practice, such as 
sector, the size of both subsidiaries and the wider companies, the presence of a trade union, and some 
aspects of ‘strategic heterogeneity’. Evidently, there are major advantages to carrying out bespoke 
surveys focused on multinationals. 
Limitations 
There are, of course, limitations. In particular, the surveys relied on a single respondent per 
firm. Seeking two or more respondents in each firm would inevitably have significantly increased the 
cost and adversely affected the response rate. One potential consequence of relying on a single 
respondent is that it can lead to common method variance in which bias is introduced through key 
variables being derived from the same respondent (Chang, Witteloostuijn and Eden, 2010). As 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie and Lee (2003) note, this is likely to be ‘particularly problematic in those 
situations in which respondents are asked to provide retrospective accounts of their attitudes, 
perceptions and/or behaviors’ (2003:881). In our study the data were neither retrospective nor 
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attitudinal; rather, they were derived from questions about contemporary aspects of the organization 
and the subsidiary. We are still mindful of the likelihood of some measurement error in our data and 
so following Wright et al. (2001) we took a number of steps to minimize such error by: ensuring that 
the most knowledgeable and authoritative respondent was used; being sensitive to the information 
demands on the respondent; communicating in advance the kind of information we would require; and 
devoting considerable time to the wording of the items through exhaustive development and piloting 
of the questionnaire. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the use of a single respondent as a limitation. 
There are other limitations too of course. The cell sizes are at times a little small, and variation within 
cells sometimes is limited. Moreover, some of the controls, such as those relating to ‘strategic 
heterogeneity’, might be refined further in future research. 
While claims concerning the universal primacy of either standardization or local adaptation to 
institutional constraints are attractive in providing a neat story, our analysis has shown that neither is 
an accurate picture. Of course, our findings cannot be generalized across all areas of HR practice, nor 
to all countries, and we acknowledge these ‘boundary constraints’ (Whetten, 1989:492) on our 
argument. It follows that it will be useful to extend the range of countries in future research. A natural 
extension to this analysis would be to extend it to new countries. One extension would be to the USA, 
the largest destination for, and source of, FDI. This would present the opportunity to consider US 
MNCs in their domestic setting, and compare them with foreign MNCs. Another extension would be 
to emerging or transition economies, which have been both the recipient and source of a growing 
amount of foreign direct investment and have been exposed to western management practices. Would 
the same conclusions regarding the influences of dominance and standardization on the one hand and 
national distinctiveness and localization on the other? This is a task left to the future. 
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Footnotes 
 
1. We constructed weights in cases where the difference between the population and the 
achieved sample was greater than 5%. .Our analysis indicated that the descriptive statistics 
did not change using weighted data. Following conventions, weights are not appropriate for 
the multivariate analysis.    
2. We created a series of dummy variables (Professional; Associate Professional and Technical; 
Administrative; Skilled Trades; Sales; Operators; Elementary; and Other) and included these 
in additional analyses to check whether the occupational category of the LOG affected the 
results. In some cases we encountered difficulties in getting these data, meaning that we 
would have had to exclude Denmark from the paper had we included this variable in the full 
analysis. Nevertheless, we were keen to explore the impact of including the LOG variable in 
the other four countries and found that the country differences revealed in Tables 4a – 4c 
remained almost exactly the same.  
3. To explore the data further, we also created an index of the six practices and conducted linear 
regression analysis on this index. The support for the hypotheses tested this way was broadly 
similar to that generated by the logistic regressions on the individual practices. Moreover, we 
split the index of six practices into two indices, one for managers and one for the LOG, and 
the results were very similar to those for the single index.  
4. Given that Table 1 shows that the UK and Spain share many similarities in terms of inequality 
and union coverage, and that Ireland and Canada also share similarities, we also conducted 
the analysis with these countries paired together. Thus the analysis contained a Nordic 
reference category and the UK-Spain and Ireland-Canada. The pattern of the results is very 
similar to those reported in the paper. 
5. From the models with interactions reported in columns C in Tables 4a to 4c and in Table 4d, 
we can analyze differences in the take-up of practices for different countries and groups of 
MNCs. Let 𝑋′𝛽 be the linear combination of control variables and their associated 
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parameters. Considering the model in column C in Tables 4a to 4c, the probability of taking-
up a given practice is given by (we omit the subindex for the firms):  
𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝑋
′𝛽 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐾 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑎 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽5𝑈𝑆𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 
+𝛽6𝑈𝐾 ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑎 ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝑜𝑤𝑛), 
where F(.) is the cumulative logistic distribution, USown is the dummy for US MNCs (ref. 
category: non US MNCs) and UK, Canada, Ireland and Spain are dummies for each country 
(ref. category: Nordic group, composed by Denmark and Norway). If we are interested, for 
example, in UK vs Denmark-Norway in the domestic operations, we compare these two 
probabilities:  𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝑋
′𝛽 + 𝛽1) for UK, and 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝑋
′𝛽) for the Nordic group. If we are 
interested in the same comparison, UK vs Denmark-Norway, but in US MNCs, the 
probabilities to compare are: 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝑋
′𝛽 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽5 + 𝛽6) for UK, and  
𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝑋
′𝛽 + 𝛽5) in the Nordic group. We proceed analogously for all the possible 
comparisons. 
Considering the models in Table 4d, that include the interactions of the country dummies (for 
the six individual countries) with US ownership and also with being a domestic firm (ref. 
category: UK*USowned), the probability of taking-up a given practice is given by: 
𝐹(𝜆0 + 𝑋
′𝜆 + 𝜆1𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑎 ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝜆2𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝜆3𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 
+𝜆4𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝜆5𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦 ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 
+𝜆6𝑈𝐾 ∗ 𝑈𝐾_𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝜆7𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑎 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑎_𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝜆8𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑_𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 
+𝜆9𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝜆10𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘_𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝜆11𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛) 
In we are interested, for example, in the differences in UK between US MNCs and indigenous 
firms, we compare: 𝐹(𝜆0 + 𝑋
′𝜆) for US MNCs in UK, and 𝐹(𝜆0 + 𝑋
′𝜆 + 𝜆6) for domestic 
firms in UK. In Canada, the probabilities to compare are: 𝐹(𝜆0 + 𝑋
′𝜆 + 𝜆1) for US MNCs in 
Canada, and 𝐹(𝜆0 + 𝑋
′𝜆 + 𝜆7) for Canadian firms in Canada. Analogously, we can compare 
US MNCs and indigenous firms in each country. 
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Table 1 – Inequality and Union Density at National Level 
  
Ranking Inequality (gini 
coefficient) 
Union density 
(OECD) 
1 USA (0.39) USA (10.8%) 
2 UK (0.35) Spain (17.5%) 
3 Spain (0.34) UK (25.4%) 
4 Canada (0.32) Canada (27.2%) 
5 Ireland (0.30) Ireland (29.6%) 
6 Norway (0.25) Norway (53.5%) 
7 Denmark (0.25) Denmark (66.8%) 
 
Source: OECD.StatExtracts 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the Dependent Variables (% of firms) 
 
 
  UK Canada Ireland Spain Den Norw 
Appraisal 
for the 
LOG 
Indigenous 93 68 58 61 48 68 
US 80 72 81 80 88 100 
All 84 71 76 70 63 74 
 
Appraisal 
for 
Managers 
Indigenous 100 90 88 83 63 72 
US 95 96 96 88 88 100 
All 96 95 94 86 72 78 
 
Forced 
Dist’n for 
the LOG 
Indigenous 9 12 6 17 15 27 
US 20 27 33 31 33 50 
All 17 23 26 25 22 31 
 
Forced 
Dist’n for 
Managers 
Indigenous 12 16 12 22 25 38 
US 26 41 42 30 40 50 
All 22 34 35 27 31 41 
 
Variable 
pay for the 
LOG 
Indigenous 70 63 59 54 50 61 
US 77 57 70 71 76 71 
All 75 59 67 63 60 63 
 
Variable 
Pay for 
Managers 
Indigenous 84 95 88 98 80 83 
US 93 92 91 97 76 71 
All 91 92 90 98 79 81 
 
The variables for forced distribution include those who were not asked whether they had a forced distribution on 
the basis that they did not have the prerequisite of an individual performance appraisal (these cases were coded 
as not having a forced distribution).     
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Table 3: Means and Correlations of the Explanatory Variables 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
(%) 
 
 
N Sector Sub size 
Union 
pres 
WWsize
–Small 
WWsize
–Med 
WWsize
–Large 
Int’l HR 
comm. 
HR 
Network  UK Canada Ireland Spain 
Den-
mark 
 
 
Norway 
US-
owned 
Sector – prod’n 56.5 720 1.000               
Sub Size (1000+) 43.5 713 -0.016 1.000              
Union presence 61.2 717 0.245* 0.226* 1.000             
WWsize–Small 38.7 696 0.082* -0.260* -0.079* 1.000            
WWsize–Med 34.9 696 -0.003 0.123* 0.053 -0.581* 1.000           
WWsize–Large 26.4 696 -0.087* 0.154* 0.029 -0.476* -0.439* 1.000          
Int’l HR comm. 66.0 706 -0.028 -0.001 0.013 -0.203* 0.060 0.158* 1.000         
HR Network 1.77# 699 -0.028 0.070 -0.150* -0.252* 0.004 0.274* 0.323* 1.000        
UK 23.2 720 -0.009 0.029 -0.170* -0.001 0.026 -0.027 -0.089* -0.044 1.000       
Canada 20.7 720 0.192* -0.054 -0.100* 0.075* 0.022 -0.106* 0.049 0.202* -0.281* 1.000      
Ireland 20.6 720 -0.046 -0.072 -0.075* -0.023 -0.049 0.079* -0.003 0.046 -0.280* -0.260* 1.000     
Spain 24.0 720 -0.163* 0.113* 0.195* -0.112* 0.022 0.099* 0.066 -0.144* -0.309* -0.287* -0.286* 1.000    
Denmark 6.5 720 0.028 -0.062 0.127* 0.045 -0.053 0.008 -0.009 -0.055 -0.145* -0.135* -0.134* -0.149* 1.000   
Norway 5.0 720 0.034 0.030 0.131* 0.068 0.020 -0.096* -0.034 -0.025 -0.126* -0.117* -0.117* -0.129* -0.061 1.000  
US-owned 61.7 720 0.000 -0.334* -0.263* -0.333* 0.023 0.343* 0.145* 0.257* 0.136* 0.100* 0.069 -0.112* -0.139* -0.199* 1.000 
 
*. Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
# - the HR Network Intensity is a mean 
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Table 4a: Regression Results - Appraisal  
 
 
  LOG Managers 
  A B C A B C (a) 
 
 
 
Controls 
Sector -1.146(0.228)*** -1.184(0.242)*** -1.210(0.252)*** -0.274(0.344) -0.399(0.369) -0.256(0.391) 
Subsidiary size 0.074(0.209) 0.244(0.244) 0.364(0.253) 0.535(0.324)*  0.860(0.399)** 0.745(0.399)* 
Union Presence -1.676(0.265)*** -1.596(0.281)*** -1.614(0.283)*** -1.019(0.406)** -0.382(0.428) -0.407(0.460) 
WW size –Medium 0.138(0.246) -0.027(0.268) -0.117(0.273) 0.376(0.347) 0.125(0.398) 0.284(0.429) 
WW size – Large 0.331(0.282) 0.000(0.332) -0.275(0.353) 1.393(0.683)** 0.966(0.710) 1.026(0.737) 
Int’l HR committee 0.914(0.214)*** 0.934(0.217)*** 0.937(0.218)*** 1.585(0.337)*** 1.660(0.334)*** 1.573(0.346)*** 
Int’l HR Network 0.077(0.077) 0.092(0.081) 0.085(0.083) 0.323(0.135)** 0.286(0.147)* 0.264(0.154)* 
Countries 
(ref cat: Den/Nor) 
UK  0.273(0.396) 1.885(0.763)**  2.240(0.601)***  
Canada  -0.546(0.388) 0.050(0.542)  1.208(0.568)** 0.788(0.658) 
Ireland  -0.233(0.369) -0.245(0.482)  1.291(0.499)** 1.173(0.606)* 
Spain  -0.223(0.362) -0.185(0.447)  0.541(0.446) 0.787(0.525) 
Origin US  owned  0.423(0.273) 1.911(0.878)**  0.509(0.440) 0.940(0.839) 
Interactions 
Host x USow 
(ref cat: 
(Den/Nor) x USow) 
UK  x US owned   -3.171(1.121)***    
Canada  x US owned   -1.900(0.953)**   0.441(1.115) 
Ireland  x US owned   -0.905(0.924)   0.016(1.088) 
Spain  x US owned   -0.780(0.907)   -0.949(0.960) 
Constant  2.169(0.320)*** 2.095(0.451)*** 1.866(0.491)*** 1.514(0.350)*** -0.021(0.541) -0.127(0.569) 
N  647 647 647 652 652 504 
Nagelkerke R2  0.265 0.282 0.311 0.267 0.335 0.324 
Cox and Snell R2  0.179 0.191 0.211 0.120 0.151 0.160 
Model sig  104.43*** 109.34*** 116.62*** 64.20*** 96.58*** 73.98*** 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(a)UK not included (no variability of this practice for indigenous firms in UK, see Table 2) 
*** significant at 1% level ** significant at 5% level  * significant at 10% level 
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Table 4b: Regression results – Forced distribution 
 
  LOG Managers 
  A B C A B C 
 
 
 
Controls 
Sector -0.814(0.212)*** -0.731(0.217)*** -0.790(0.215)*** -0.191(0.190) -0.188(0.196) -0.223(0.197) 
Subsidiary size -0.493(0.222)** -0.238(0.252) -0.268(0.257) -0.415(0.199)** -0.177(0.228) -0.234(0.231) 
Union Presence -0.635(0.214)*** -0.854(0.243)*** -0.804(0.247)*** -0.522(0.196)*** -0.642(0.216)*** -0.634(0.222)*** 
WW size –Medium 0.238(0.258) 0.101(0.268) 0.087(0.272) 0.337(0.232) 0.242(0.248) 0.257(0.252) 
WW size – Large 0.816(0.264)*** 0.518(0.302)* 0.501(0.313) 0.870(0.248)*** 0.677(0.297)** 0.763(0.305)** 
Int’l HR committee 0.249(0.241) 0.180(0.243) 0.187(0.252) 0.482(0.220)** 0.442(0.224)** 0.434(0.229)* 
Int’l HR Network 0.206(0.079)** 0.221(0.084)*** 0.221(0.086)** 0.208(0.071)*** 0.190(0.076)** 0.206(0.078)*** 
Countries 
(ref cat: Den/Nor) 
UK  -1.420(0.443)*** -1.712(0.785)**  -1.308(0.391)*** -1.649(0.666)** 
Canada  -1.145(0.426)*** -1.014(0.679)  -0.713(0.370)* -1.440(0.618)** 
Ireland  -0.977(0.402)** -2.031(0.818)**  -0.796(0.364)** -1.255(0.608)** 
Spain  -0.576(0.397) -0.467(0.518)  -0.683(0.363)* -0.354(0.446) 
Origin US  owned   0.541(0.283)* 0.255(0.682)  0.455(0.259)* 0.068(0.629) 
Interactions 
Host x USow 
(ref cat: 
(Den/Nor) x USow) 
UK  x US owned   0.552(0.960)   0.652(0.860) 
Canada  x US owned   0.045(0.896)   1.144(0.822) 
Ireland  x US owned   1.414(0.994)   0.781(0.817) 
Spain  x US owned   -0.042(0.775)   -0.408(0.712) 
Constant  -1.202(0.275)*** -0.539 (0.428) -0.444(0.484) -1.406(0.245)*** -0.807(0.383)** -0.706(0.428) 
N  633 633 633 634 634 634 
Nagelkerke R2  0.162 0.191 0.199 0.132 0.158 0.173 
Cox and Snell R2  0.106 0.125 0.130 0.093 0.111 0.122 
Model sig  57.49*** 70.74*** 73.73*** 51.58*** 64.16*** 69.04*** 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 1% level ** significant at 5% level  * significant at 10% level 
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Table 4c: Regression results – Pay linked to performance 
 
  LOG Managers 
  A B C A B C 
 
 
 
Controls 
Sector -0.398(0.185)** -0.313(0.195) -0.288(0.199) -0.529(0.319)* -0.433(0.348) -0.556(0.341) 
Subsidiary size -0.160(0.186) -0.264(0.213) -0.226(0.216) 0.381(0.342) 0.064(0.388) -0.032(0.392) 
Union Presence -0.862(0.203)*** -0.860(0.218)*** -0.896(0.224)*** 0.170(0.333) 0.329(0.377) 0.419(0.392) 
WW size –Medium 0.193(0.208) 0.183(0.226) 0.169(0.225) -0.099(0.338) -0.128(0.363) -0.094(0.365) 
WW size – Large 0.719(0.253)*** 0.672(0.299)** 0.597(0.299)** 0.459(0.462) 0.507(0.493) 0.685(0.497) 
Int’l HR committee -0.174(0.200) -0.187(0.202) -0.184(0.203) 0.420(0.325) 0.352(0.347) 0.417(0.342) 
Int’l HR Network 0.142(0.068)** 0.206(0.073)*** 0.197(0.075)*** 0.184(0.119) 0.251(0.127)** 0.236(0.127)* 
Countries 
(ref cat: Den/Nor) 
UK  0.590(0.350)* 0.770(0.485)  1.727(0.546)*** 0.792(0.663) 
Canada  -0.444(0.343) 0.019(0.485)  1.291(0.504)** 1.342(0.864) 
Ireland  0.019(0.334) 0.303(0.456)  0.992(0.469)** 0.589(0.570) 
Spain  0.207(0.314) 0.120(0.377)  2.380(0.598)*** 2.973(1.085)*** 
Origin US  owned  -0.094(0.245) 0.434(0.647)  -0.389(0.427) -1.204(0.737) 
Interactions 
Host x USow 
(ref cat: 
(Den/Nor) x USow) 
UK  x US owned   -0.623(0.770)   1.941(0.957)** 
Canada  x US owned   -1.008(0.763)   0.545(1.084) 
Ireland  x US owned   -0.769(0.765)   1.108(0.941) 
Spain  x US owned   -0.014(0.716)   -0.548(1.341) 
Constant  1.149(0.243)*** 1.021(0.362)*** 0.927(0.389)** 1.890(0.349)*** 0.791(0.489) 0.996(0.506)** 
N  639 639 639 643 643 643 
Nagelkerke R2  0.113 0.140 0.148 0.058 0.135 0.153 
Cox and Snell R2  0.082 0.101 0.107 0.025 0.058 0.066 
Model sig  51.42*** 62.69*** 67.17*** 14.89** 34.94*** 42.57*** 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 1% level ** significant at 5% level  * significant at 10% level 
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Table 4d: Regression results – All outcome variables (variation within countries)  
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(a)Norway not included (no variability of this practice for US firms in Norway, see Table 2))  
(b)UK and Norway not included (no variability of this practice for indigenous firms in UK and US firms in Norway, see Table 2))  
*** significant at 1% level ** significant at 5% level  * significant at 10% level 
 
  
  Appraisal 
LOG(a) 
Appraisal 
Managers(b) 
Forced distrib. 
LOG 
Forced distrib. 
Managers 
Variable pay 
LOG 
Variable pay 
Managers 
 
 
 
Controls 
Sector -1.266(0.256)*** -0.311(0.419) -0.789(0.217)*** -0.215(0.198) -0.286(0.199) -0.556(0.342) 
Subsidiary size 0.394(0.264) 0.737(0.430)* -0.317(0.260) -0.260(0.233) -0.227(0.217) -0.022(0.400) 
Union Presence -1.61(0.288)*** -0.515(0.495) -0.823(0.248)*** -0.642(0.222)*** -0.896(0.225 )*** 0.427(0.394) 
WW size –Medium -0.154(0.282) 0.266(0.464) 0.078(0.275) 0.252(0.253) 0.167(0.226) -0.095(0.366) 
WW size – Large -0.319(0.362) 1.032(0.773) 0.541(0.317)* 0.784(0.309)** 0.588(0.301)* 0.640(0.504) 
Int’l HR committee 0.967(0.226)*** 1.811(0.390)*** 0.207(0.251) 0.441(0.229)* -0.186(0.203) 0.407(0.347) 
Int’l HR Network 0.11(0.086) 0.327(0.165)** 0.215(0.086)** 0.204(0.078)*** 0.199(0.075)*** 0.246(0.129)* 
Interactions 
 
Host x US owned 
 
  
UK x US owned Ref. category  Ref. category Ref. category Ref. category Ref. category 
Can x US owned -0.576(0.381) Ref. category 0.188(0.361) 0.698(0.324)** -1.138(0.333)*** -0.850(0.575) 
Ire x US owned 0.13(0.417) -0.022(0.862) 0.527(0.347) 0.514(0.318) -0.613(0.341)* -1.030(0.565)* 
Sp x US owned 0.316(0.458) -1.418(0.793)* 0.635(0.397) 0.228(0.372) -0.038(0.386) -0.298(0.728) 
Den x US owned 0.819(0.837) -1.837(0.888)** 0.677(0.707) 0.713(0.655) 0.007(0.763) -2.538(0.878)*** 
Nor x US owned   1.995(0.932)** 1.541(0.945) -0.415(0.946) -3.051(1.147)*** 
 
Interactions 
 
Indigenous MNCs 
 
UK x UK owned 1.269(0.74)*  -0.790(0.694) -0.709(0.599) 0.190(0.463) -0.737(0.718) 
Can x Can owned -0.609(0.523) -1.371(0.848) -0.086(0.603) -0.501(0.568) -0.565(0.469) -0.203(0.956) 
Ire x Ire owned -0.893(0.446)** -0.901(0.768) -1.105(0.771) -0.313(0.568) -0.279(0.451) -0.946(0.708) 
Sp x Sp owned -0.824(0.406)** -1.266(0.768)* 0.465(0.457) 0.589(0.399) -0.460(0.362) 1.439(1.160) 
Dk x Dk owned -1.277(0.571)** -2.488(0.808)*** 0.213(0.745) 0.469(0.593) -0.768(0.474) -1.564(0.680)** 
Nor x Nor owned   1.492(0.632)** 1.336(0.561)** -0.373(0.514) -1.504(0.744)** 
Constant  2.49(0.427)*** 1.977(0.715)*** -1.332(0.359)*** -1.629(0.322)*** 1.507(0.338)*** 2.516(0.535)*** 
N  616  472 633 634 639 643  
Nagelkerke R2  0.329  0.365 0.208 0.177 0.150 0.153  
Cox and Snell R2  0.223  0.176 0.136 0.125 0.108  0.067  
Model sig  116.22*** 67.97*** 77.40*** 72.59*** 67.28*** 42.50*** 
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Table 5: Differences in the take-up of PM practices 
 
 
Differences across countries 
 Appraisal 
LOG 
Appraisal 
Managers 
Forced distrib. 
LOG 
Forced distrib. 
Managers 
Variable pay 
LOG 
Variable pay 
Managers 
UK   vs  Den-Nor 0.037 (0.054) 0.143 (0.041)*** -0.229 (0.076)*** -0.249 (0.075)*** 0.114 (0.069)* 0.175 (0.062)*** 
Canada  vs  Den-Nor -0.085 (0.059) 0.101 (0.049)** -0.194 (0.076)*** -0.147 (0.077)* -0.097 (0.074) 0.149 (0.063)** 
Ireland  vs  Den-Nor -0.035 (0.054) 0.105 (0.044)** -0.171 (0.074)** -0.162 (0.075)** 0.004 (0.070) 0.125 (0.064)** 
Spain  vs  Den-Nor -0.033 (0.053) 0.053 (0.045) -0.107 (0.076) -0.141 (0.076)* 0.042 (0.065) 0.199 (0.056)*** 
 
Differences across countries in the domestic operations 
 Appraisal 
LOG 
Appraisal 
Managers(a) 
Forced distrib. 
LOG 
Forced distrib. 
Managers 
Variable pay 
LOG 
Variable pay 
Managers 
UK   vs  Den-Nor 0.231 (0.077)***  -0.235 (0.098)** -0.282 (0.100)*** 0.148 (0.090) 0.080 (0.062) 
Canada  vs  Den-Nor 0.008 (0.092) 0.087 (0.070) -0.164 (0.105) -0.257 (0.100)** 0.004 (0.103) 0.114 (0.059)* 
Ireland  vs  Den-Nor -0.043 (0.084) 0.119 (0.061)* -0.259 (0.092)*** -0.232 (0.104)** 0.062 (0.093) 0.064 (0.060) 
Spain  vs  Den-Nor -0.032 (0.078) 0.087 (0.058) -0.084 (0.095) -0.075 (0.095) 0.025 (0.080) 0.154 (0.048)*** 
 
Differences across countries in US MNCs 
 Appraisal 
LOG 
Appraisal 
Managers(a) 
Forced distrib. 
LOG 
Forced distrib. 
Managers 
Variable pay 
LOG 
Variable pay 
Managers 
UK   vs  Den-Nor -0.135 (0.065)**  -0.200 (0.116)* -0.197 (0.120)* 0.027 (0.116) 0.333 (0.135)** 
Canada  vs  Den-Nor -0.223 (0.068)*** 0.071 (0.063) -0.173 (0.116) -0.064 (0.122) -0.211 (0.119)* 0.283 (0.136)** 
Ireland  vs  Den-Nor -0.116 (0.064)* 0.070 (0.062) -0.117 (0.115) -0.100 (0.118) -0.095 (0.118) 0.266 (0.139)* 
Spain  vs  Den-Nor -0.092 (0.065) -0.014 (0.068) -0.098 (0.116) -0.156 (0.119) 0.020 (0.116) 0.319 (0.137)** 
 
Differences between US MNCs and indigenous MNCs in each country 
 Appraisal 
LOG(b) 
Appraisal 
Managers(c) 
Forced distrib. 
LOG 
Forced distrib. 
Managers 
Variable pay 
LOG 
Variable pay 
Managers 
Diff. in  UK -0.130 (0.060)**  0.084 (0.063) 0.099 (0.073) -0.033 (0.078) 0.042 (0.046) 
Diff. in Canada 0.005 (0.087) 0.082 (0.055) 0.038 (0.078) 0.206 (0.082)** -0.127 (0.097) -0.041 (0.051) 
Diff. in Ireland 0.160 (0.079)** 0.045 (0.041) 0.188 (0.064)*** 0.143 (0.089) -0.069 (0.094) -0.008 (0.059) 
Diff. in Spain 0.171 (0.071)** -0.013 (0.060) 0.029 (0.080) -0.070 (0.081) 0.083 (0.079) -0.046 (0.033) 
Diff. in Denmark 0.307 (0.123)** 0.078 (0.106) 0.076 (0.155) 0.050 (0.167) 0.157 (0.158) -0.166 (0.173) 
Diff. in Norway   0.108 (0.220) 0.046 (0.227) -0.009 (0.207) -0.284 (0.234) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses computed through the Delta method;  
(a)UK not included; (b)Norway not included; (c)UK and Norway not included. See comments to Tables 4a and 4d. 
*** significant at 1% level ** significant at 5% level  * significant at 10% level 
 
36 
 
 Appendix: Representativeness of the National Surveys, % of firms 
 
   UK Canada Ireland Spain Denmark Norway 
 
 
Sector 
 
Production 
 
Population 
Achieved Sample 
53 
57 
59 
66 
48 
46 
54 
47 
67 
71 
63 
73 
Services 
 
Population 
Achieved Sample 
47 
43 
41 
33 
53 
54 
46 
53 
33 
29 
37 
27 
 
 
 
Country 
of 
Origin 
Domestic Population 
Achieved Sample 
18 
15 
23 
21 
12 
18 
18 
25 
27 
27 
28 
39 
North 
American 
Population 
Achieved Sample 
38 
41 
57 
51 
43 
41 
21 
28 
14 
15 
13 
10 
European 
 
Population 
Achieved Sample 
30 
31 
17 
21 
39 
33 
57 
42 
54 
52 
56 
50 
East Asia Population 
Achieved Sample 
8 
8 
 
4 
7 
 
6 
7 
 
4 
5 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
3 
1 Rest of 
World 
Population 
Achieved Sample 
6 
6 
 
 
 
Size 
100-499 Population 
Achieved Sample 
46 
42 
46 
48 
69 
54 
61 
35 
59 
58 
52 
38 
500-999 Population 
Achieved Sample 
18 
18 
19 
18 
13 
16 
15 
18 
19 
20 
20 
24 
1000-4999 Population 
Achieved Sample 
27 
32 
26 
28 
 
18 
29 
 
18 
34 
18 
19 
24 
31 
5000+ Population 
Achieved Sample 
9 
9 
9 
6 
6 
13 
4 
4 
4 
7 
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